Note:
This document was scanned into Microsoft Word from a
photocopy. Although the type scanned in with minimal errors,
the photographs and drawings did not scan in well enough to be
of use. Click here for a photo of a Texas Tower.
This
document was sent to me by Tom Page and I thank him for his
effort. Jeff
Barnes, Jan 1999.
Conception
and Approval,
1952-1953. Fastening radar platforms to the ocean floor was
first studied in the summer of 1952. MIT’s Lincoln
Laboratory analyzed the feasibility of stationing search and
height-finding radars on giant metal towers planted at
intervals along the ocean bottom, similar to oil-drilling rigs
employed in the Gulf of Mexico. Lincoln Laboratory concluded
that a cluster of such Texas Towers might, in fact, profitably
serve air defense purposes if erected about 100 miles off the
northeastern coast of the Atlantic seaboard. There, elevation
of the ocean floor, owing to the continental shelf,
conveniently afforded areas shallow enough, yet far enough at
sea, to be strategically important. Being fixed installations,
Texas Towers could accommodate heavy duty, long-range radars
like those used on land, instead of lighter, medium range sets
like those used aboard picket vessels.
That
the preponderant amount of America’s high priority targets
were situated inside the U.S. northeastern industrial
complex—within easy striking distance of the Atlantic
coast—made the stakes involved that much more serious.
Advance warning furnished by Texas Towers, in combination with
other elements of the growing early warning network, including
Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft
together with Navy radar picket ships, promised to reduce
America’s vulnerability to surprise attack. Simultaneously,
target tracking information supplied by Texas Towers would
enable ADC’s control centers to vector fighter aircraft to
intercept unknown targets far out at sea, where hostile
bombers could be destroyed long before reaching bomb release
lines. In conjunction with AEW&C aircraft and Navy picket
ships, Texas Towers would contribute to extending contiguous
east-coast radar coverage some 300 to 500 miles seaward. In
terms of the air threat of the 1950’s, this meant a gain of
at least 30 extra minutes warning time of an oncoming bomber
attack.1
ADC
found no complaint with Lincoln Laboratory’s recommendation
that five Texas Towers be installed. Lincoln obligingly named
the five sites best suited for positioning radars: (1)
Nantucket Shoal (Lat. 40°45’N.,
69°19’W.,
80foot depth) 100 miles southeast of Rhode Island; (2) Georges
Shoal (Lat. 41°44’N.
, Long. 67°47’W.
, 56-foot depth) , 110 miles east of Cape Cod; (3) Cashes
Ledge (Lat. 42°53’N.,
Long. 68°57’W.,
36-foot depth), 100 miles east of New Hampshire; (4) Brown’s
Bank (Lat. 42°47’N.,
Long. 65°37’W.,
84foot depth), 75 miles south of Nova Scotia; (5) Unnamed
Shoal (Lat. 39°48’N.,
Long. 72°40’W.,
185-foot depth), 84 miles southeast of New York City.
In
September 1952, ADC voiced its desire that USAF favorably
consider the proposed Texas Tower layout for future
implementation. USAF first looked into the legality of
positioning fixed radar platforms on the high seas, whereupon
the Judge Advocate ruled that no violation of international
law would result from their placement adjacent to territorial
waters. Upon deliberating on the other aspects concerned, USAF,
too, became convinced of their necessity and, in the autumn of
1953. authorized construction of all five. Accordingly,
funds were budgeted for them during Fiscal
Years.1954 and
1955; the Navy’s Bureau of Yards and Docks was vested with
authority to conduct ocean surveys, execute design
engineering, draw up specifications, and perform the other
services requisite to letting out contract work to the lowest
competent bidder.2
Groundwork
for Implementation, 1953-1955.
All manner of things had to be determined before precise
specifications detailing internal and external
dimensions—could be drawn up for release to competitive
bidders. There was the matter of deciding how many and what
types of personnel to people the towers with. Types of
equipment to install had to be settled beforehand: not only
surveillance and communications kinds for operational
purposes, but also food preparation and recreational kinds,
among others, for logistic and morale purposes. How to
replenish, with some regularity, expendable commodities and
other supply items, required thoughtful consideration, so as
to strike a proper balance between overloading and
under-supplying each tower. These and other questions raised
by the concept of sticking Texas Towers radars 100 or so miles
from shore constituted problems of no mean proportion, which
ADC, in the early 1950’s, speedily came to grips with.
Manpower
totals for sustaining three-shift, round-the-clock operations
was no easy figure to compute. Initially, ADC had in mind
remoting tower radar data, via submarine cable, from tower to
shore, where the weapons control function of vectoring
interceptors would be handled by the crew at the parent ACW
shore site. This, accordingly, lessened the number of persons
whose presence would be needed for tower duty. First, in
September 1952, a crew of 22 men was postulated as a likely
number for maintaining continuous operations, presupposing
that Texas Towers would have no target identification or
weapons control responsibilities. This estimate climbed to 25
in August 1953, to provide technicians for servicing the
second of two height-finders programmed. A few months later,
in November 1953, the personnel contingent was re-estimated at
27, upped next to 41 in July 1954. It then developed that no
submarine cable would be strung for remoting, that existing
“slowed down” video could not be made to work properly in
its stead, and that too much time would be consumed either
fabricating or adapting old equipment to this purpose. ADC
therefore was obliged to change heart, electing to program
control functions at each tower, together with the attendant
increase in personnel this entailed. Until near the end of the
decade, when the Texas Towers were scheduled convert to SAGE
operations (whereby the Lincoln Fine System, AN/FST-2, would
be installed to feed lance data automatically from the tower
to specified SAGE centers), the Texas Towers were to operate
manually, utilizing GPA-37
consoles for vectoring interceptors to their
respective targets. Consequently, personnel estimates were
upped again in January 1955, this time to 46 in all, to each
tower with personnel enough to handle the control function,
along with the other conventional surveillance duties. Space
enough was allowed during the stages (late 1954-1955) to
accommodate upwards of 72 which was fortunate considering that
the size of the personnel force continued growing. In
mid-1956, after first tower was erected, the staffing
structure was hiked from 46 to 49 officers and airmen for
sustaining Texas Tower missions. Even this later proved
inadequate by five spaces, as evidenced by a staffing pattern
in 1957 calling for a total of 54, composed of six officers
and 48 airmen. This large a contingent embraced personnel not
only to operate and maintain the surveillance, control, and
communications equipment, together with specialists in the
plumbing, heating, refrigeration, medical and cooking business
to help keep body and soul alive, but also to fill unique
spaces, insofar as ADC was concerned, peculiar to the Texas
Tower mission. Into this latter class was categorized the slot
for one S/Sgt (Staff Sergeant) “seaman” and one A/lC
(Airman First Class) “marine engineman” to handle maritime
matters associated with Texas Tower operations. So specialized
were some of these maritime support jobs, that ADC, until
subsequently discouraged by USAF, showed interest in a 1956
proposal to transfer the entire Texas Tower
program—operations, maintenance and all—to the Navy
Department.
Besides
the commander, who was ordinarily a captain, something like
three to four officer weapons controllers (AFSC 1644),
together with half a dozen or so airmen ACW operators working
under them, and nearly an equal number of radar repairmen
under charge of an electronics officer (AFSC 3044), were
assigned each crew. Communications operators and technician
repairmen were well represented, too. Each crew was divided
into three shifts.
One
thing ADC insisted on regarding personnel manning was the
right to form two crews per tower. ADC desired to alternate
on-station tower duty so that no single crew spent more than
one month aboard a Texas Tower without time, the following
month, spent ashore, when the second of two crews took its
month’s turn, on a rotational basis. Tower duty,
incidentally, counted as time aggregated on an isolated
overseas tour.
But
USAF was reluctant to authorize the extra spaces that this
two-crew plan entailed. The most USAF would bend, was a 1.5
crew manning ratio per tower. ADC persevered in reaffirming
need for a 2.0 crew manning ratio, and eventually resorted to
improvising the difference by borrowing from its own
resources.3
Determining
what kind of equipment to install was more easily determined,
particularly with regard to surveillance equipment. Precedents
for selecting search and height-finding radars already existed
in the form of ADC’s ground-based AC&W sites. Drawing
from its experience with them, ADC picked the FPS-3A
long-range search set (modified subsequently to the FPS-20A
configuration), and two FPS-6 long-range height-finders. For
protection from wind, rain and snow, all three antennas were
to be enclosed in arctic tower radomes composed of a
rubberized dome sprouting bulbously 55 feet in diameter, and
supported underneath by a walled framework. These helped
characterize the shape TexasTowers finally assumed,
silhouetting a clover-leaf profile on stilts.
Ordinarily,
installation of a pair of FPS-6 height finders and an FPS-3A
search set entailed separating them at least 150 feet apart,
for good reasons. If bunched closely together, there was a
real danger of mutual electronic interference being generated
when radar antennas faced one another. An exception to this
rule, however, had to be made aboard Texas Towers, where
surface space, of necessity,
was constricted. To minimize chances of mutual interference,
yet compactly squeeze all equipment atop a relatively small
surface, the FPS-3A search set, sandwiched between the other
two, was elevated so as to tower above them. The two FPS-6
antennas, moreover, were pointed in opposite directions, one
facing toward land, the other toward sea, being slaved
together, and to the FPS-3A, for synchronizing movements. As a
final measure of precaution, interference blankers were
installed to blot out electronic signals emanating from FPS-6
antennas when pointing toward the FPS-3A.4
Tower-to-shore
communications presented a problem different from that of
radars. There simply was no network of telephone lines
conveniently at hand to tap into, as at ACW stations on land.
Notwithstanding this, the question was settled long in advance
of tower erection time. ADC originally wanted-to string
submarine cables from tower to shore at a cost estimated at
first to be $1,000,000 per tower. Follow-on estimates that
nearly doubled this amount, however, helped doom the submarine
cable plan. Another system equally favored by ADC was adopted
for primary point-to-point communications: multiple-channel
tropospheric scatter radio, described in more detail below.5
After
the size of the forthcoming personnel contingent and of the
equipment inventory was, for the most part, known, work
proceeded on the platform to accommodate them. Beforehand, the
Navy Bureau of Yards and Docks had contracted core-drilling
work in July 1954 to the De Long Corporation and the Raymond
Concrete Pile Company. Feasibility studies, on 18 June 1954,
were farmed out to the architect-engineering firms of Moran,
Proctor, Mueser and Rutledge of New York City, and the
Anderson-Nichols and Company of Boston. These studies were
soon completed and, by October 1954, their results submitted.
Hereupon, the Bureau of Yards and Docks contracted with the
same firms to formulate the engineering and design work for
five towers. They were expressly designed to withstand
125-mile per hour winds and 35-foot high waves.
Texas
Tower 2.
Responsibility for constructing the first Texas Tower was
entrusted to Bethlehem Steel Company. By then, each of the
five approved sites had been designated as follows: Cashes
Ledge was named TT-1 (for Texas Tower 1); Georges Shoal, TT-2;
Nantucket Shoal, TT-3; Unnamed Shoal, TT-4; and Brown’s
Bank, TT-5. This numbering sequence, however, was not
indicative of site-erection priorities. Indeed, it was TT-2,
Georges Shoal that ADC chose for its first Texas Tower.
Situated some 110 miles east of Cape Cod, the TT-2 unit,
besides enjoying a location in shallow waters that would help
facilitate its erection, was to be among the first of ADC’s
radar units to tie into the emerging SAGE network.6
By
the spring of 1955 Bethlehem Steel had completed the first
platform at its Quincy, Massachusetts facility. The steel
platform was shaped into an equilateral triangle with cropped
ends, measuring 210 feet along all three sides, providing
about half an acre of surface area. So that it would
conveniently house programmed personnel and equipment,
combined with stores, reserves, and spare parts essential for
long-term stays, the platform was welded into a self
contained, compartmentalized unit 20-feet high, subdivided
into separate decks. The bottom-most deck was employed mainly
for maintenance and storage space, where tanks and pumps were
located. The next deck was partitioned into living quarters, a
galley and mess hall, administrative offices, heating and air
conditioning areas, recreational areas, food storage space, a
dispensary and library. Atop this, across approximately half
the wedge-shaped platform, was the helicopter landing area.
Occupying the rest of the triangle was the uppermost
operations deck, some 210 feet long by 60 feet wide, rising 12
feet above the rest of the 20-foot high platform. Inside this
deck was the surveillance and control operations area, on top
of which would be perched the three radar antennas enveloped
by pressurized arctic towers. Equipped with radars and other
gear, the platform, weighed 6,500 tons or so.7
Transporting
the first platform from shore to site was a toilsome task.
There was trouble enough launching it into water, let alone
hauling it to sea. Yet, by June 1955, it was successfully
floated and fitted for its sea voyage. Responsibility for
towing it to site and then erecting it, was vested in the
Raymond and De Long Companies, who embarked with their charge
on 12
July 1955. Within two days time, they arrived on
site. Hereupon, temporary legs were dropped to the shoal
(about 55 feet under water); the tower platform was jacked up
to rest on the temporary legs high above the water, while the
three permanent legs, or caissons were readied. Each of the
three tubular legs was designed for lasting support, measuring
over 160 feet long, the first 48 or so feet of which were
ensconced snugly into the shoal, the middle 55 feet of which
remained immersed in water, and the top 60 or so feet of which
rose above the water’s surface, lifting the platform high
and out of harm’s way. The legs were versatile enough to be
logistically, as well as architecturally purposeful. For
inside each steel leg was incased a 140-foot long steel tube
six feet in diameter where thousands of gallons of fluid
reserves, mostly water and fuel oil, might be stored,
surrounded by a jacket of concrete over two feet thick. One of
the three hollow legs contained seawater tapped for conversion
to drinking water. To this end, distillation equipment was
included for producing several gallons of fresh water per
minute.8
By
the end of 1955, TT-2
was assembled, with bolts tightened and the rest
shipshape enough for USAF to assume beneficial occupancy. This
it did, effective 2 December 1955. The FPS-3A and twin FPS-6
height radars, as programmed, were brought aboard and
installed. They detected targets of B-47 size, flying about
50,000 feet, up to 200 nautical miles away. But the same
targets flying at low altitudes say 500 feet—because of
line-of-sight radar characteristics, were discernible by radar
only up to 50 nautical miles away. It was for this reason,
among others, that airborne early warning and control (AEW&C)
aircraft later patrolled certain off-shore stations to cover
low-altitude radar gaps over looked by Texas Towers, picket
vessels, and shore-based radars.9
Along
with the radars arrived the communications equipment, without
which Texas Towers, being unable to transmit their findings to
shore, would be incapacitated. Foremost among this equipment
came the point-to-point, FRC-56 tropospheric scatter system.
Three parabolic-disk antennas, measuring 28 feet in diameter,
were mounted vertically, side by side, along the platform edge
supporting the operations deck. Two at a time were utilized
for transmitting messages, while all three combined received
them. The signals were deflected from the tropospheric layer
of Earth’s atmosphere, between the 30,000 and 60,000-foot
level. A wide spectrum of ultra-high frequencies was thus
exploitable without recourse to expensive intermediate relay
stations. Normally unaffected by atmospheric disturbances, the
tropospheric scatter radio system worked well in the manual
system for distances up to about 200 miles, and was intended
to serve equally as well for automated SAGE communications
later to come. At either end of the system, telephone circuits
were patched in so that voice communications could be reliably
maintained.
Apart
from this primary point-to-point system, there was installed
conventional BF radio equipment for tower-to-shore backup
communications, and UHF and VHF radio equipment for
tower-to-air communications. Teletype, cryptographic,
telephonic intercommunications and public-address systems were
incorporated as well,
together with certain aircraft radio navigational
devices. GPA-37
equipment was integrated to facilitate weapons
control operations. To power the communications, navigation
and radar equipment thus brought aboard, eleven 250 KW diesel
generators were rigged so that less than half of them,
operating in unison, would supply sufficient electricity
during any given time. Air conditioning units were furnished
to prevent certain of the equipment from over-heating.10
Site
P-10 (762 ACW Squadron) at North Truro AFS, Massachusetts, was
designated the parent station for TT-2. Operational concepts
governing their relationships were diligently spelled out in a
full-dress operations plan, first published by ADC in July
1954, later revised in July 1956. Other matters were carefully
worked out, such as methods for transportation and supply. Two
H-21B helicopters per tower were authorized by USAF, four of
which were based at Otis AFB and two, at Suffolk County AFB.
The twin-rotor H-21B had a theoretical capacity for carrying
10 passengers or 2,000 pounds of freight. When equipped with
necessary flotation and survival gear, however, the H-21B’s
capacity was cut to eight persons or 1,550 pounds of freight.
Other cargo, particularly POL, was furnished periodically by
ship. Fuel, food and lubricants,were stocked to provide at
least a 30-day reserve; spare parts were on hand for
operational equipment to last 45 days On 7 May 1956, TT-2
achieved the status of a limited operationally ready aircraft
control and warning station. For purposes of furnishing
logistical support for TT-2, and for the others when the need
arose, the 4604 AC&W Squadron (Texas Towers) was activated
8 October, 1956 at Otis AFB, Massachusetts, which two months
later (December 1956), was re-designated the 4604th
Support Squadron (Texas Towers).11
Texas
Towers 3 and 4.
Meanwhile, by November 1955, bids for the next two towers had
been accepted. Construction contracts for both of them were
awarded J.
Rich Steers, Inc. of New York City in collaboration
with Morrison-Knudsen, Inc., of Boise, Idaho. Except for minor
changes (including longer legs and increased storage capacity
for diesel oil), these two practically duplicated the
configuration and basic arrangement of TT-2.
Because
of future commitments to integrate Texas Towers into upcoming
SAGE centers during the late 1950’s, ADC picked TT-3 at
Nantucket Shoal, and TT-4 at Unnamed Shoal, for its next two
towers. This left only TT-1 (Cashes Ledge) and TT-5 (Brown’s
Bank) unaccounted for. USAF, for purposes of economizing, was
anxious to rid the program of them both.
At
first, ADC resisted all attempts in this direction. Then, in
late 1956, because of the promise of increased off-shore radar
coverage by coastal AC&W squadrons in the vicinity, where
TT-1 and TT-5 were scheduled to go, ADC agreed to drop TT-1
and TT-5 from all further consideration, leaving three towers,
TT-2,TT-3 and TT-4, in the program.12
In
1956 and 1957, work
proceeded on TT-3 and 4. Platform and legs of TT-3
were readied by mid-1956, launched the
night of 7
August 1956, and towed to Nantucket Shoal and
erected that same month. On 29 November 1956, ADC assumed
beneficial occupancy. Next month the superstructure and main
supports of TT-4 were under construction at South Portland,
Maine. These were completed by mid-1957,
then, starting 28 June 1957, were towed to sea and
placed at Unnamed Shoal. ADC gained beneficial occupancy in
November 1957.
The
New Life.
During these same years (1956-1957), personnel serving at TT‑2
— then functioning manually on a limited operational
status—were learning of peculiarities uniquely associated
with Texas Tower duty. For one thing, the metal superstructure
seemed to vibrate constantly. As the FPS-20A long-range radar
antenna (converted from the original FPS-3A model), continued
unceasingly to spin (except when out of commission for
maintenance), the diesel generators, to grind out their power,
and the other equipment, to crank away at their appointed
tasks, TT-2 rattled vibrantly from the ordeal. Standing like a
three-pronged tuning fork, the tower resonated with noises
that spread farther, and amplified greater, than initially
occasioned by their source. Matters were not improved when,
every half-minute or so during the frequent fogs, the
dismal-sounding foghorn croaked out its forlorn message.
Still
worse, since it affected operations, was the phenomenon of
temperature inversion suffered mostly in summertime. This
caused loss of radar coverage, creating, in certain instances,
permanent echoes that obscured or distorted radarscope
reception. On occasion, equipment components generated
electromagnetic disturbances that interfered with, or
disrupted, operations of other electronics apparatus.
Notwithstanding these and other shortcomings, tower crews
became inured to those problems not susceptible of change. And
TT-2, effective 17 April 1958, became fully operational
manually, then in September 1958, operational as a SAGE unit.
TT-3 followed suit in October 1958. TT-4, in mid-April 1959,
was declared manually operational, and in April 1960, SAGE
operational. Cost of the towers, including platform, legs,
radars and communications equipment was reckoned at around $13
million each, and with operating expenses figuring about $1.5
million annually thereafter. TT-3 reported to, and comprised
an annex of the 773rd AC&-W Squadron (Montauk,
New York); TT-4, the 646th AC&W Squadron
(Highlands, New Jersey).13
Communications
Difficulties. While
the three towers, by 1959, were thus up and operating, all was
not well with them. One of the main difficulties centered on
the FRC-56 tropospheric scatter communications system. When
functioning in the manual system, employing voice
communications, tropospheric radio proved sufficiently
effective. But faulty communications ensued after FST-2
equipment was installed to automate communications for SAGE
operations, wherein tower-to-shore communications were
transmitted and received, not by voice, but by pre-coded,
digitally computed electronic signals for automatic
assimilation by SAGE computers. Since SAGE shore computers
were calibrated to reject all except perfectly accurate
inputs, the tropospheric system, as then in operation, simply
could not accomplish the task. It was decided about this same
time not to replace each FPS-20A search set and twin FPS-6
height finders with Frequency Diversity FPS-27 search and
FPS-26 height finder sets, as programmed theretofore, because
of the expense involved. The FPS-20A’s at TT-2 and TT-3,
instead, were later modified with GPA-103 equipment in late
1960, incorporating certain ECCM devices that reshaped their
FPS-20A to the FPS67
configuration.
Several
remedies, meanwhile, were suggested to correct the problem
with communications. One proposal reverted to ADC’s original
plan: stretching a submarine cable from shore to each tower.
Another solution proposed by the MITRE Corporation looked more
toward refining the existing apparatus, so that tropospheric
radio, with the addition of Code Translation Data Service (CTDS),
would still bear the burden of primary
tower-to-shore transmission and reception. CTDS would tolerate
greater signal level variations than existing subsystems.
American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T), which
frowned on this idea, was approached with a proposal to take
charge, on a contract basis, of maintenance and operation
responsibilities for the tropospheric system. While solutions
to this problem were under consideration, the three Texas
Towers reverted to operating as a manual adjunct, employing
voice communications, in the far-flung semi-automated SAGE
network.14
In
1960, a proposal was advanced that perhaps would have solved
some part of the communications problem, namely the
installation aboard Texas Towers of ALRI (Airborne Long Range
Inputs) equipment designed to automate the communications
process. This plan was soon discarded, for several reasons,
not least of which was the dearth of available space for
accommodating the ALRI equipment. The same year, all further
consideration was dropped of stringing submarine cables, or
adding CTDS, leaving only the prospect of AT&T taking
charge of maintenance and operations. Antenna realignments
combined
with improved maintenance, supply, training and
operating procedures enhanced tropospheric communications
appreciably during 1960, and to all intents and purposes
rendered them satisfactory for SAGE as well as for manual
operations.15
Tragedy
of TT-4.
A problem of inherent stability at Texas Tower 4 loomed so
large at this time that it overshadowed all previous Texas
Tower problems. Ever since TT-4 was towed to site in mid-1957,
it had become an engineering nightmare. To begin with,
supports for TT-4 had been made somewhat differently from
those fabricated for TT-2 and TT-3, chiefly because of the
extra depth involved. Whereas TT-2 and TT-3 stood firmly in
relatively shallow waters, 56 and 80 feet, respectively, TT-4
stood in water two to three times deeper, 185 feet to be
exact. A series of underwater bracing-s were made to
compensate for the extra stresses incurred. But in the process
of towing TT-4 to site in June-July 1957, two diagonal braces,
vital to lacing the three legs snugly together, were lost. The
contractor and the Bureau of Yards and Docks decided to
improvise repairs on the spot, rather than return to shore for
reworking defective portions. The
original design strength, consequently, was not
restored.
From
the time it was erected, Texas Tower 4 wobbled some when under
stress caused by brisk winds and waves. Platform motion became
the rule rather than the exception. The Navy, in late 1958,
conducted underwater surveys of TT-4’s supports, resulting
in the discovery that certain collar connection bolts either
had sheared or worn loose. The problem was aggravated because
the defective portion weakened not only its immediate area,
but also shifted considerable stress onto non-defective
members. From late 1958 to May 1959, with at least six
interruptions due to storms, the contractor effected repairs
that stabilized the platform for several months. Four
successive storms struck in the winter of 1959-1960, which
threatened to undo tower stability all over again.
In
early 1960, another underwater team was sent down to take
stock of things and found certain pins and connections
irreparably damaged; whereupon a set of above-water bracings
were manufactured and, by August 1960, applied. According to
the contractor, original design strength was restored to TT-4
— it could withstand winds up to 125 miles per hour and
breaking waves up to 35 feet high. Scarcely a month elapsed,
however, when Hurricane “Donna” (12 September 1960)
whirled in at forces exceeding design specifications: 132mile
per hour winds and breaking waves exceeding 50-foot heights.
TT-4, evacuated of all personnel two days before, survived
“Donna,” but not without first shaking and rocking a great
deal from the impact. Part of TT-4’s superstructure was
destroyed; worst of all, below-water bracings were fractured,
cutting overall strength to 55 per cent of what it had been
built up to prior to “Donna.” Further examination of above
and below-water components resulted in a decision to undertake
extensive repairs in the spring of 1961. 1 February 1961 was
established as the date for complete evacuation of TT-4.
Meantime, a maintenance crew of 28 persons -- 14 USAF and 14
contractor repair personnel—were stationed aboard to perform
certain repair work. Then on 14 and 15 January 1961, TT-4 was
again caught in a storm that battered the tower with winds up
to 85 miles per hour and waves up to 35 feet high thrashed its
legs. Finally, TT-4 could stand no more. At about 1920 hours
the night of 15 January, one of its three legs snapped in
half; the remaining two thereupon broke, and the platform,
with all hands aboard, sank to the ocean’s bottom.16
Demise
of TT-2 and TT-3, 1961-1964.
The tragedy of TT-4, as much as anything else, sealed the fate
of TT-2 and TT-3. While both remaining towers were immediately
checked for safety and structural strength, and pronounced
sound in this regard, their days were numbered. This was first
hinted in March 1961, when Lieutenant General Robert M. Lee,
ADC commander wrote:17
At
this time there is no valid reason for abandonment of Texas
Towers No. 2 and 3. However, in view of the inherent danger
and the current inability to evacuate safely during storm
conditions, this headquarters, in conjunction with
Headquarters NORAD, will continue to consider the operational
requirement for these towers. There is a possibility that,
after the ALRI (Automatic Long Range Input) System becomes
operational in AEW&Con aircraft, sufficient reliable
coverage may be achieved so that the contribution of Texas
Towers 2 and 3 to the air defense system will be reduced. In
this event, shutdown of the towers, with a resultant
elimination of the inherent risk, and saving in money and
manpower, may be possible. On the basis of technical advice
now available there is no concern for the stability of the
towers, but should the result of the engineering survey
indicate the existence of any deficiencies, immediate action
will be taken to discontinue their operation.
Ultimately,
it was decided to do just that: phase out TT-2 and TT-3 when
ALRI equipment became operational in the AEW aircraft wing
based at Otis AFB, Massachusetts. ALRI, in essence, would
automate much more of the off-shore surveillance and weapons
control functions along the Atlantic seaboard, and with ALRI-equipped
aircraft covering virtually the same area as TT-2 and TT-3,
the two towers would become expendable commodities. Until ALRI
became operational. However, the command sought to implement
the best of all possible escape methods aboard the surviving
towers, so that the TT-4 episode would not be repeated.
Several experimental methods were considered and all but one
were ruled out a — watertight escape capsule. Just such a
survival capsule, capable of accommodating seven persons, with
food and oxygen enough to last 15 days, was designed by the
Electric Boat Division of General Dynamics. Two were made, one
for each tower, and they were installed in October 1962.
Meantime, tower evacuation criteria were revised, so that all
would depart except a seven-man emergency stand-by crew
whenever 50-knot winds or 35-foot waves were forecast. A
seven-man standby crew was necessitated because of a
complication occasioned by Soviet trawlers, which often
loitered close by
the towers. Without a standby crew to keep guard,
Soviet sailors might try to board a fully evacuated tower,
then claim possession on grounds of salvage rights. If worse
came to worse as regards tower stability during a storm, the
seven-man standby crew could scramble into the survival
capsule for protection. Even the seven-man crew would evacuate
when 70-knot winds, or more, were in the offing. The Coast
Guard, in an on-again, off-again commitment, promised to
position a vessel, if available, near completely evacuated
towers to prevent unauthorized boarding by Soviet mariners.
All
this, while the Atlantic Ocean, as if impatient to rid it of
the troublesome towers, attacked them from above and below. A
succession of storms struck during 1962 and 1963 that forced
abandonment of the towers a number of times. Between October
1961 and March 1962, for instance, the towers were evacuated
ten times, resulting in loss of the equivalent of 120
operational days. Still later that same year, TT-2 and TT-3
experienced many more evacuations. Also, TT-3 lost at least
two inflatable radomes, one of which was blown off the FPS-67
search set in the summer of 1962, and the other of which
collapsed over a FPS-6 height-finder in January 1963.
Simultaneous with these forces working above, strong ocean
currents worked steadily beneath to undermine the foundation
of the two towers. Scouring of serious proportions resulted,
flushing away rock fill supporting the three legs of each
tower down to a depth of 10 feet. Even rock-fill replacement
leveled around them in November 1961 failed to stay the action
of these underwater forces. The towers, consequently, became
far more susceptible to being uprooted by storms of hurricane
strength.18
At
last, in 1963, ALRI stations became operational in the
Atlantic AEW&C aircraft fleet. The JCS, in January 1963,
authorized the inactivation of the towers. No longer having a
need for TT-2 and TT-3, and still mindful of the catastrophe
at TT-4, ADC ordered the two towers dismantled. TT-2 was first
to go, being decommissioned 15 January 1963, then stripped of
its communications and electronics equipment. Its three legs
were dynamited; but the platform, rather than float to shore,
plunged to the bottom, denying one salvage company the fruits
of its preparations. It was as if the capricious Atlantic,
vindictive to the last, pulled down another victim to its
murky bottom.
TT-3
was decommissioned 25 March 1963, and shortly relieved of its
radars and communications equipment. Special care was taken in
mid-1964 to save TT-3’s platform, the bottom deck was pumped
full of urethane foam, then sealed, to insure floatation. On 6
August 1964, the three legs were blasted out from beneath it,
whereupon TT-3 platform plunged into the ocean; cork-like, it
then rose to the surface, enabling salvage crews to drag it
shoreward. Once and for all, the episode of Texas Towers in
air defense was brought to a close.19
FOOTNOTES:
1.
ADC Historical Study No. 10, Seaward
Extension of Radar
1946-1956, pp. 71-75; ADC, Operational Plan for Texas
Towers, 20 Jul 1954 [HRF]; USAF Historical Study No.
126, The Development of Continental Air Defense to 1 September
1954, p. 72
2.
Ltr, ADC to USAF, “Extension of Radar Coverage
in the Northeast Coastal Area,” 24 Sep 1952 [Doc 91, Doc Vol
XIII, Hist of,ADC, Jan-Jun 1955]; USAF Plan, “Planning Guide
for Implement of Texas Towers,” 16 Nov 1953 [Doc 93, Doc Vol
XIII, Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 19551; Ltr, USAF to ADC, “Air
Defense Program Requirements,” 11 Jan 1954 [Doc 94, Doc Vol
XIII, Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1955]; Ltr, USAF to Bureau of Yards
& Docks, ‘IFY 1955 Advance Planning Directive - Texas
Towers,” 8 Mar 1954 [Doc 95, Doc Vol XIII, Hist of ADC,
Jan-Jun 1955); ADC Historical Study No. 10, pp. 71-72; Hist of
ADC, Jan-Jun 1961, P. 70; USAF Historical Study No. 126, pp.
72-73.
3.
See Appendix A for Texas Tower manning
structure; Ltr, ARDC to ADC, “Project Texas Towers,” 26
Sep 1952 [Doc 90, Doc Vol XIII, Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1955];
Ltr, ADC to USAF, “Texas Towers,” 24 Aug 1953 [Doc 92, Doc
Vol XIII, Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1955]; USAF, “Planning Guide
for Implementation of Texas Towers,” 16 Nov 1953 [Doc 93,
Dov Vol XIII, Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1955]; IOCY M&O (ADC)
to C&E, et.al., “Change to Detachment Manning to
be for Texas Towers,” -27 Jan 1955] IOC M&O, Doc Vol
XIII, Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1955]; ADC, “Operational Plan for
Texas Towers,” 1 Jul 1956 [HRF]; Ltr, EADF to ADC,
“Information for Guidance of Officers and Airmen Selected
for Assignment to 762ACWRON w/Duth Station at Georges Shoal
Tower Annex (T-2),” 23 Nov 1956 [HRF]; ADC Historical Study
No. 10, pp. 80-82; Ltr, ADC to USAF, “Request for
Headquarters USAF Guidance on Texas Tower operation and
Maintenance,” 26 S.ep 1956 [Doc 37 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec
19561; Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1955, pp. 34-38; Ltr and Ind, ADC
to ARDC, “Radar Video Remoting,” 12 Jan 1955 [Doc 97 in
Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 19551; Ltr and Incl, RADC to AF Cambridge
Research Center, “Use of GPA-37 with Texas Towers, n.d., ca.
Feb 1955 [Doc 99 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1955]ADC, Logistic
Support Plan for Texas Towers, 12 Mar 1956’[Doc 140 in Hist
of ADC, Jan-Jun 1956]; Hi-s-t-o-T-ADC, Jul-Dec 1956, pp.
44-45; Ltr and Incl, ADC to USAF, “Request for Headquarters
USAF Guidance on Texas Tower Operation and Maintenance, 26 Sep
1956 [Doc 37 in Hist of ADC,, 9 Nov 1956 to Ltr and Incl, ADC
to USAF, “Request for Headquarters USAF Guidance on Texas
Tower Operation and Maintenance,” 26 Sep 1956 [Doc 38 in
Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1956]; C&E Digest, Aug 1957, pp. 4-5.
4.
Ltr, ADC to USAF, “Texas Towers,” 24 Aug
1953 [Doc 92, Doc Vol XIII, Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1955];
C&E Digest, Jul 1957 pp. 13-15.
5.
See Appendix B for Texas Tower Equipment List;
Ltr,
ARDC to ADC, “Project Texas Towers,” 26 Sep 1952 [Doc 90,
Doc
Vol XIII, Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 19551; USAF, “Planning
Guide
for Implementation of Texas Towers,” 16 Nov 1953 [Doc
93,
Doc Vol XIII, Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1955]; Ltr, Rome Air
Def
Center to ADC, “Improvement and Modifications to Production
AN/GPS-37,11
19 Oct 1954 [Doc 100, Doc Vol XIII, Hist of ADC,
Jan-Jun
1955]; Ltr and Atch, MIT to ADC, 24 Feb 1955 [Doc 112, Doc Vol
XIII,
Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 19551; ADC, “Operational Texas
Towers,” 20 Jul 1954 [HRF); ADC, Plan for Texas Towers,” 1
Jul 1956 [HRF]. “Operational Plan for Texas Towers,” 1 Jul
1956
6.
ADC Historical Study No. 10, op.cit. , p. 74; “Last
of the Texas Towers, AU Review, Vol XVI, No. 1 (Nov-Dec 1964),
pp. 92-94; Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1961, pp. 70-73.
7.
ADC
Historical Study No. 10, op.cit., pp. 74-76: “Last of the
Texas Towers” AU Review, op.cit. , p. 93; C&E Digest,
Jul 1957, 13-15.
9
. EADF, “Operational Plan Texas Tower No. 2,11 1
Sep1955, P. 2 [Doc 98, Docs Vol XIII, Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun
1955 ].
10.
C&E Digest, Jul 1957, pp. 13-15 and Aug 1957, pp.
1-6.
11.
ADC Historical Study No. 10, op.cit., pp. 76,
82-84; ADC, “Operational Plan for Texas Towers, 20 Jul 1954
and 1 Jul
1956 [HRF]; Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1955, pp. 34-36;
Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1955, pp. 67-68; Hist of EADF, Jan-Jun
1956.pp. 64-68; Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1956, p. 64-68 45; ADC,
Logistic Support Plan for Texas Towers, 12 Mar 1956
[Doc 140 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1956.]
12.
ADC, IOC from ADMEL-3, “Trip Report-Texas Towers,
[Cont’d] 26 Sep 1955 [Doc 107, Doc Vol XIII, Hist of ADC,
JanJun 1955); Msg COOPR 30332, CINCNORAD to USAF, 25 Oct 1956
[Doc 109, Doc Vol XIII, Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 19551; Hist of
ADC, Jul-Dec 1956, pp. 42-43; Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1956, P.
37; Ltr, USAF to ADC “Operational
Plan for Texas Tower,” 17 Jun 1955 [Doc 80 in Hist of ADC,
Jan-Jun 1955]; Msg AFOOP OP D 55901, USAF to ADC- 30 Jun 1955
[Doc 100 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1955]; Msg ADOPR 3645, ADC to
USAF, 2 Aug 1955 [Doc 103 in Hist of ADC,
Jan-Jun 1955]; IOC, ADAIE-CA to ADAIE-C,
“Construction’Schedule Texas Tower 3 ...”
8 Aug 1956 [Doc 33 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1956.]
13.
Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1955, p. 39, Jan-Jun 1956, pp.
37-38, Jul-Dec 1956, pp.. 41-47; Hist of EADF, Jul-Dec 1956,
pp. 69-74, Jan-Jun 1958, pp. 49-50; Hist of ADC, JanJun 1959,
pp. 58-59, Jul-Dec 1959, p. 43; IOC, ADAIE-CA to ADAIE-C,
“Construction Schedule Texas Tower 3...,” 8 Aug 1956 [Doc
33 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1956]; Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1961,
pp. 72-73; C&E Digest, Aug 1957, pp. 1-6; IOC,
ADOCO-C to DCS/0, “Report of Staff Visit,” 27 Aug 1956, p.
2 [Doc 32 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1956]; C&E Digest, Nov
1958, pp. 4-6; C&E Digest, Apr 1959, p. 14; Ltr,
ADC t5-USAF, “Operational Survey of the 26 Air Division
(SAGE),” 5 May 1959 [Doc 70 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1959].
14.
Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1959, pp. 59-64, Jul-Dec 1959, pp. 43-46,
Jul-Dec 1960, P. 70; Hist of EADF, Jan-Jun 1958, P. 51; Msg
EAOCE-ER 1671, EADF to ADC, 11 Sep 1958 [Doc 73 in Hist of
ADC, Jan-Jun 1959]; Hist of EADF, JanDec 1959, P. 97; C&E
Digest, Nov 1961, p.2; Msg ROV-225, ROAMA to AMC, 3 Jul-IDTT-rDoc
70 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1960]; Western Elect Co., and USAF
SAGE Project Office, Progress Report of USAF Air Defense SAGE
System, pp. 19, 85, 1Dec 1957, p. 101; Jul 1958, pp. 35, 43,
118; 1 Jan 1959, pp. 20, 81; and 1 Oct-1959, pp. 19, 85.
1515.Hist
of ADC Jan-Jun 1960, pp. 48-49; Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1960, pp.
67-68; Joint Test Staff for SAGE Cateory III Evaluation, Final
Report, n.d., ca. 1960, p. U-14 [HRF].
16.
Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1960, pp. 70-75.: Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun
1961, pp. 69-84; ADC, “Report of Proceedings of a Board of
Officers - Loss of Texas Tower No. 4,11 4 Mar 1961 [Doc 110 in
Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1961]; Senate Hearings, Inquiry into
the Collapse of Texas Tower No. 4, Hearings Before Senate
Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on
Armed Services, 87 Congress, lst Session, May 3-17, 1961
(Washington:GPO,
1961) [Doc 113 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1961],
17.
Ltr,
ADC to USAF, “Report of Board of officers, Texas Tower No.
4,” 4 Mar 1961 [HRF].
18.Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1961, pp. 78-85; NORAD/CONAD
Historical Summary, Jul-Dec 1962, pp. 23-27; FORM RESTRICTED
DATA, USAF, Current Status Reports, Mar 1962, p. 3-20, Apr
1962, p. 3-20, May 1962, p. 3-19, Jun 1962, p. 3-19, Aug 1962
p. 3-18, Sep 1962, p. 3-16 [HRF]; ADC to ADC Staff Agencies,
“USAF Current Status Report - September 1962, “26 Oct 1962
[HRF]; C&E Digest, Nov 1961, pp. 1-5; ADC, Prog Mgt Div,
Weekly Act Rept, 14-20 Sep 1962 [HRF]; Ltr, ADC to ADCCS,
“Status of Texas Towers 2 and 3”,11 28 Nov 1962 [HRF]; Msg
BOOAC-E 0480, BOADS to 26 AD, 4 Sep 1962 [HRF]; Msg AFOOP-DEWC
60997, USAF to ADC, 10 Dec 1962 [HRF]; Msg 260OP-GP 2246, 26
AD to ADC, 17 Dec 1962 [HRF]; Also AFOOP-DELWC 66098, USAF to
ADC, 5 Jan 1963 [HRF]; Msg 260AC-E 0622, 26 AD to ADC, 11 Jan
1963 [HRF]; Msg 26IFS 01-91/631 26 AD to ADC, 17 Jan 1963.[HRF].
1
19.
“Last of the Texas Towers, AU Review, op.cit.,
92-94;
NORAD/CONAD Historical Summary, Jan-Jun 19-68,-@.-10
